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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the relationship between corporate social and environmental 
performance and financial performance for a sample of publicly traded US real estate companies. Using 
the MSCI ESG (formerly KLD) database on seven Environmental, Social & Governance dimensions in 
the 2003–2010 period, and weighting the dimensions according to prominence in the real estate sector, 
we model Tobin’s Q and annual total return in a panel data framework. The results indicate a positive 
relationship between ESG rating and Tobin’s Q but this effect is driven by ESG concerns rather than 
strengths. Consistently across all model specifications, overall ESG ratings are associated with lower 
returns. Negative scores appear to result in higher returns, at least in the short run, but positive scores 
have no significant impact on returns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Environmentally responsible and sustainable busi-
ness practices have become more prominent for 
corporations’ strategic and operational activities in 
step with growing concerns about climate change 
and investment ethics. For investors, the scope of 
responsible investment can cover not only environ-
mental issues and climate change mitigation but 
also the effects of businesses on a broad range of so-
cial and ethical concerns. The real estate sector has 
been engaging increasingly with concepts such as 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG), Cor-
porate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Responsible 
Property Investment (RPI). While there has been a 
longstanding and substantial body of work on the 
relationship between corporate ESG performance 
(CESGP) and corporate financial performance 
(CFP), this paper presents the first quantitative 
empirical study of the real estate sector. 
The motivation for focusing this study on the 
real estate sector instead of following the com-
mon practice of analyzing the entire universe of 
monitored companies is threefold. Firstly, focusing 
on the real estate sector allows us to investigate 
whether ESG performance has a weak impact on 
asset-based industries as might be expected from 
the low brand recognition of real estate companies 
and, indeed, most asset-based industries. Second-
ly, the long-term nature of most real estate invest-
ments potentially aligns better with the long-term 
sustainability objectives of ESG policies. This 
would imply a stronger effect. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, previous studies of the relationship 
between CESGP and CFP have identified econom-
ic sector as a key variable (see Waddock, Graves 
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1997; Chand 2006; Porter, Kramer 2006). Expo-
sure to social, environmental and governance is-
sues varies widely across industries. Consequent-
ly, multi-sector studies can conceal or average 
out sector-specific effects (Griffin, Mahon 1997). 
Indeed, Chand (2006) suggests that research on 
the link between ESG performance and financial 
performance should focus on a single industry. 
Thus, the present study investigates the im-
plications of this strategic shift in the allocation 
of resources towards such ethical concerns for the 
performance of commercial real estate companies. 
Specifically, it aims to assess whether there is a 
link between the Environmental, Social and Gov-
ernance (ESG) ratings of large real estate com-
panies and their financial performance. We have 
organized the study as follows. The next section 
situates this paper within the existing literature. 
In the third section, we describe our data and pre-
sent the summary statistics. The research strategy 
is outlined in the fourth section and the results 
from the empirical analysis are discussed. Finally, 
the implications of our findings are discussed.
2. EFFECTS OF CORPORATE 
RESPONSBILITY: THE EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE
Implying that resources allocated to ESG consti-
tute a deadweight loss and a negative relationship 
between CESGP and CFP, Milton Friedman (1970) 
controversially stated that “the social responsibil-
ity of business is to increase its profits”. The coun-
ter-argument has been that narrow neo-classical 
theories of the firm neglect the contribution of hu-
man and social capital to corporate financial per-
formance. In particular, in the last two decades, 
a plethora of acronyms such as ESG, CSR, RPI 
and SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) have 
become increasingly mainstream. While the scope 
of these labels has been mutating and contested, 
there is some common ground. At their core is the 
incorporation of non-financial issues in investment 
and business decision-making. 
In a study of motives to ‘go green’, Bansal and 
Roth (2000) propose three types of motive profiles 
that can individually or together stimulate a high-
er level of ESG commitment – the caring profile, 
the competitive profile and the concerned profile. 
In the caring profile, it is the organizational lead-
ership that is the key driver of a firm’s ESG com-
mitment. In the competitive profile, a firm is mo-
tivated by business advantage. For instance, many 
REITs highlight the savings in energy costs attrib-
utable to implementing more sustainable practices. 
Finally, although this type of motive may rarely be 
stated publicly, the concerned profile is character-
ized in terms of a pre-emptive, collective response 
by a group of market participants in an industry 
that introduces improvements in ESG performance 
in order to obtain reputational and regulatory ben-
efits. Both the competitive and concerned profiles 
imply that the primary aim of ESG activities is to 
improve CFP. 
Nevertheless, improvements in financial perfor-
mance can be directly linked to rationales for allo-
cating resources to ESG activities. In terms of a pri-
ori expectations, ESG has been analyzed through a 
number of theoretical lenses which generate con-
trasting expected relationships between CESGP 
and CFP. For instance, instrumental stakeholder 
theory stresses the contribution of relationships 
with key stakeholders (other than shareholders) 
such as employees, suppliers, customers and the 
local community to financial performance. Closely 
related stakeholder–agency theory emphasizes 
how ESG activities can reduce the agency costs 
within corporate structures by improving interest 
alignment and monitoring of the actions of em-
ployers, managers and employees. Similarly, firm-
as-contract theory also highlights the significance 
of, often implied, contracts with stakeholders as 
drivers of firms’ financial performance. Hence, the 
expected causal relationship is that CESGP should 
determine CFP. In contrast, slack resources theory 
implies the opposite relationship – that CFP de-
termines CESGP. It proposes that surpluses gen-
erated by prior financial performance release re-
sources for ESG activities. While theories are often 
presented as mutually exclusive, it is possible that, 
similar to issue of motivation, the relative impor-
tance of resource availability and the salience of 
relationships with stakeholders may vary between 
sectors or firms and/or over time. Russo and Per-
rini (2010) report that firm size is a decisive fac-
tor and argue that the social capital approach is 
relevant for understanding ESG commitments of 
SMEs whereas stakeholder theory is more apt for 
explaining the actions of large firms. Roberts and 
Dowling (2002) find that high corporate reputation 
is linked to sustained financial performance over 
relatively long periods.
Recent reviews of this topic also generally sug-
gest that the balance of the evidence is supportive 
of a positive relationship between ESG perfor-
mance and financial performance. Van Beurden 
and Gössling (2008) find that earlier reviews in-
cluded too many papers from the period 1970–1990 
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when the issue of ESG had low socio-political 
prominence. Their review of studies from 1990 
onwards concluded that the vast majority of stud-
ies had found a positive relationship between ESG 
performance and financial performance. However, 
Orlitzky’s (2011) large-scale meta-analysis reveals 
a somewhat troubling finding, i.e. that the direc-
tion and strength of the reported relationship be-
tween CESGP and CFP appears to depend on the 
disciplinary affiliation of the authors and journals 
reporting it. Publications in economics, finance 
and accounting have tended to find significantly 
lower average correlations than findings published 
in management, business ethics or business and 
society journals. 
In the literature on the performance of socially 
responsible investments, it has been found that cli-
entele effects can lead to different effects on prices, 
returns and risk. The key transmission mechanism 
is that a decrease in the size of the investor base 
produces a neglect effect associated with exclusion-
ary screening, lower demand for ‘sin’ securities, a 
negative effect on prices and a positive effect on 
returns. The body of work on the performance of 
securitized SRI funds is broadly consistent with 
underperformance in terms of returns (see Bauer 
et al. 2005; Geczy et al. 2003; Renneboog et al. 
2008; Lee, Faff 2009; Manescu 2010). For so-called 
‘sin’ stocks, most studies find a higher cost of capi-
tal, lower security prices and higher returns. 
Within the real estate literature, empirical es-
timation of the relationship between CESGP and 
CFP has received rather limited attention. There 
is a body of essentially descriptive and/or qualita-
tive work that has largely focused on the investi-
gating the increasing importance of SRI and ESG 
issues for real estate investors (for example, see 
Hebb et al. 2010; Newell 2008, 2009; Rapson et al. 
2007). Focusing largely on governance per se, there 
is a body of work looking at US REITS on the re-
lationship between governance ratings and other 
agency costs with financial performance (for ex-
amples, see Bauer et al. 2010; Bianco et al. 2007; 
Eichholtz et al. 2012; Hartzell et al. 2008). Results 
have been mixed. Hartzell et al. (2008) find that 
firms with stronger governance structures have 
higher initial IPO valuations and have better long-
term operating performance than their peers. In 
contrast, Bauer et al. (2010) find that their index 
of governance strength is related neither to RE-
ITs’ Tobin’s Q nor to Return on Assets, Return on 
Equity and Funds from Operation and attribute 
this to the requirement for US REITs to distribute 
at least 90% of operational earnings. By contrast, 
Eichholtz et al. (2012) show in their empirical 
analysis that the proportion of ‘green’ buildings in 
a REIT portfolio is positively related with its oper-
ating performance. 
The mechanism by which a strong ESG com-
mitment is value adding in terms of improved 
CFP can be difficult to disentangle. In Friedma-
nian terms, the direct costs of allocating capital 
to ESG activities are relatively straightforward to 
measure. As Fig. 1 indicates, the direct costs are 
Fig. 1. Costs and benefits of an active ESG strategy
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associated with the implementation, monitoring 
and reporting of an active ESG strategy. Indirect 
costs are also produced by the rejection of poten-
tial profitable business opportunities that may 
conflict with ESG-related objectives. Linking back 
to stakeholder and firm-as-contract theories, the 
arguments for a positive effect on financial per-
formance tend to emphasize increases in relation-
al wealth (see Luo, Bhattacharya 2009). Factors 
broadly related to trust, such as increased trans-
parency and reduced information asymmetry, may 
create reputational and branding benefits that im-
prove key relationships with employees, sharehold-
ers, customers, suppliers and the community (see 
Surroca et al. 2010). A strong ESG commitment 
implies more information about the expected cash 
flow distribution, reduced principal-agent costs 
and lower investors’ risk premium. More directly, 
the cost of capital may be reduced as socially re-
sponsible investors may be prepared to accept a 
lower return from socially responsible businesses 
(Cajias et al. 2012). 
As a result, it is argued that companies with 
strong ESG commitments are more operationally 
and financially stable and resilient. These poten-
tial positive effects of ESG activities on CFP are 
then, mediated through a range of variables such 
as governance structures and reputation benefits 
inter alia. Both costs and benefits are mediated 
through the capital markets where intangible as-
sets are priced and returns generated. However, 
assuming efficient market pricing of investment 
in ESG, the returns from ESG are expected to be 
contingent upon the nature of the firm, the specific 
business sector and conditions in the broader busi-
ness environment (see Campbell 2007). Further, 
at the firm level, it has been argued that there 
may be an optimal level of investment in ESG pro-
ducing a curvilinear relationship between CESGP 
and CFP. The empirical analysis presented in the 
following sections takes into account these sector 
and firm-specific effects but is unable to test the 
theoretical arguments relating to transmission 
mechanisms. The empirical researcher is limited 
to observing the financial outcomes of these pro-
cesses but cannot test them directly, at least not 
with the data employed in this study. 
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Largely in response to demand from market par-
ticipants, metrics have emerged that benchmark 
corporate ESG performance (CESGP). Although by 
no means providing perfect measures of CESGP, 
the emergence of such metrics has facilitated a sub-
stantial body of research on the causes and effects 
of variations in CESGP. Similar to credit rating 
agencies, social and environmental rating agencies 
ostensibly aim to provide independent measures of 
corporations’ ESG performance, increase transpar-
ency and reduce the search costs associated with 
socially responsible investment strategies. Ratings 
may be based on firms’ past performance and/or 
they can also incorporate a firm’s future potential 
relative position by evaluating their plans to im-
prove future ESG performance (see Chatterji et al. 
2009). It should be acknowledged that the quality 
of ESG ratings have been subject to some criti-
cisms concerning their own lack of transparency 
and have been subject to little robust evaluation 
themselves (see Chatterji et al. 2009; Semenova 
2010). McWilliams and Siegel (2000) report that 
inclusion of company R&D expenditure as a predic-
tor of financial performance renders CSR metrics 
neutral or insignificant. Hawken’s (2004) scathing 
report on the SRI mutual fund sector highlighted 
the arbitrariness and inconsistencies in criteria 
used to assess firms’ suitability for inclusion in re-
sponsibly invested portfolios. 
As stated above, this study draws upon the 
MSCI ESG database. Its social and environmen-
tal ratings are one of the most long established 
and have been widely used by academic research-
ers. Created by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini 
and Co., the ESG (formerly KLD) index uses a 
proprietary system to assess companies on seven 
aspects of their ESG performance. They are com-
munity relations, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, human rights 
and products. Various scales are used to assess 
the performance in terms of major strength, mi-
nor strength, major weakness etc. The number of 
indicators has varied from year to year with an up-
ward trend. The index is constructed from a com-
bination of publicly available sources, other data 
organizations, direct communication with compa-
nies themselves and government information. Typ-
ically, the annual data is published several months 
after the end of the calendar year. This means that 
the ‘contemporaneous’ MSCI ESG score refers to a 
company’s ESG performance in the previous cal-
endar year. This point is further complicated by 
the fact that ESG MSCI ratings incorporate some 
information that is already public knowledge and 
hence priced accordingly in the market while part 
of the information set may be new, particularly the 
new information on a company’s overall ESG per-
formance compared to a benchmark group. 
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To create a summary measure of overall ESG 
performance, we first combine the information on 























where: Sit and Cit are individual binary strength 
and concern ratings for real estate company i at 
time t and the denominators St and Ct represent 
the total number of rating criteria respectively in a 
given year. Although the number of strengths and 
concerns changes over the years, this calculation 
method ensures comparability over time. A score 
of 50 always implies a neutral position, relative to 
strength and concerns; a score greater than 50 im-
plies more ‘strengths’ than ‘concerns’. The farther 
the score is from 50 (towards 100), the stronger 
is the relative ‘strength’; a score less than 50 im-
plies more ‘concerns’ than ‘strengths’ and farther 
the score is from 50 (towards 0), the stronger is 
the relative ‘concerns’. This index formulation com-
bines the number of strengths and concerns on a 
continuous scale and facilitates comparison across 
companies. 
Previous studies have argued that the above 
method of creating a combined ESG score is prob-
lematic as all ESG criteria are treated as equally 
meaningful or important in the calculation of the 
score (see Griffin, Mahon 1997; Simpson, Kohers 
2002). This problem is likely to be even more pro-
nounced in the present study of listed US real es-
tate companies where it can be assumed that some 
of the general ESG criteria are largely irrelevant 
or inapplicable (e.g. investments in tobacco, fire-
arms, nuclear power as well as most human rights 
issues) while other criteria may be crucial for an 
ESG assessment of this sector (e.g. environmental 
criteria or governance issues). 
Therefore, we devise a weighted ESG score in 
the following manner: 
= =




it it jt it jt
j j
ESG S w C w , (2)
where: Sit and Cit are individual binary strength 
and concern ratings for real estate company i at 
time t multiplied by the criterion weights wjt. In 
this index, a score of 1 represents a neutral posi-
tion where strengths and concerns balance each 
other out whereas score below 1 indicate more 




The weights in Equation 2 are derived by: 
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The weight of an ESG criterion in year t is 
based on the sum of individual binary counts for 
all real estate companies for this criterion over the 
sum of all criteria and real estate companies in 
that year. Put simply, the weight of a criterion is 
determined by the number of non-zero weightings 
for real estate companies in a particular year. In 
contrast to the un-weighted calculation, strengths 
and concerns are allowed to be asymmetric to the 
extent that the sum of weights of strengths does 
not necessarily equal the sum of weights of con-
cerns. This weighting scheme is in principle equiv-
alent to a Paasche current-weighted-index in that 
the individual weights of the criteria vary from 
year to year. 
The comprehensive database required to con-
duct our analysis was assembled as follows. Based 
on the CUSIP codes of the companies contained in 
the MSCI ESG database, financial data for these 
companies was extracted from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Since the CUSIP codes do not match 
in all cases, for example due to spelling variations 
or after a company is restructured or renamed, we 
developed an algorithm that compares the full com-
pany names and respective CUSIPs in both MSCI 
and Datastream. Next, we identify real estate com-
panies using ICB industry classification codes. Fol-
lowing the ICB definition as used by FTSE and 
Dow Jones and Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
the real estate sector includes real estate services 
(brokers and real estate agents), development com-
panies, investment companies and REITs, but ex-
cludes pure construction companies. Table 1 gives 
a detailed overview of variable definitions and 
sources. The sample used in the panel regression 
consists of 341 real estate companies in the unbal-
anced sample from 2003 to 2010. The ESG ratings 
were published by KLD for listed US companies as 
early as the 1990s but the sample is considerably 
smaller pre-2003 which is a particular problem for 
an in-depth sectoral study such as this one. Be-
sides sample size, there is also a possibility that 
2003 was a watershed year regarding definitions 
and measurement standards although we were un-
able to confirm this. Our choice of using an unbal-
anced sample versus a balanced sample was guided 
by sample size considerations and concerns about 
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selection bias if we were to exclude all companies 
that were founded or formed (for example through 
mergers and acquisitions) post-2002. 
Of the total 341 real estate companies in our 
sample, 148 companies or 43% are REITS specializ-
ing in office, retail, residential, diversified, etc. are 
identified. Although all companies in our dataset 
have considerable exposure to real estate markets, 
a subset of them are classified in wider areas such 
as financial services and construction. The sample 
also includes 89 financial services companies as 
well as 56 firms defined as hotels and travel/lei-
sure. Further, 17 companies are classified as resi-
dential real estate developers, 22 as Real Estate 
Holding, Services and Investment companies and 
nine as other real estate companies. Table 2 pro-
vides summary statistics and a correlation matrix 
of the variables used in the panel data analysis. 
At first glance, the ESG variables of interest 
do not appear to be highly correlated with either 
Tobin’s Q or Total Returns. To examine within-sec-
tor variation in the key variables (Tobin’s Q, Total 
Return and ESG weighted score), Table 3 shows 
Table 1. Variable description and source
Variable Definition Source 
Tobin’s Q Long term firm value measured as market capitalization plus debt (long and 
short) term debt and preferred stock divided by total assets as defined by Han 
(2006). 
Datastream
Total Returns Annual change in the Stock Prices.




Return and Volatility adjusted following the sector composition of the sample 
for each cross section. 
ESG Score Environmental, social and governance performance index for the corresponding 
dimension. Calculated as: 
= =




it it jt it jt
j j
ESG S w C w
KLD-Database















Leverage Ratio, calculated as short term debt and current proportion of long term debt 
divided by total assets. 
Data stream




Calculated as Market Price-Year End * Common Shares Outstanding.
NAREIT Return Total annual return of the NAREIT index. 
the development of these variables over the 2003–
2010 study period broken down by real estate sub-
sector. Throughout this period, Tobin’s Q is lowest 
for the home construction sector and highest for 
real estate companies in the financial service sec-
tor. There is a general marked decline in Tobin’s 
Qs across all industries during the years of the 
financial crisis from 2007 onwards. This pattern 
is even more pronounced in the total return fig-
ures which turn sharply negative across real estate 
sub-sectors in 2007–2008. Interestingly, the home 
construction industry appears to have been affect-
ed by this negative trend earlier than other real 
estate companies. Regarding the ESG scores, it is 
remarkable that the scores of all industries except 
hotels have dropped considerably in the most re-
cent year (2010). It is not clear whether this is due 
to the introduction of new criteria and definitions 
into the MSCI ESG scores or a lagged effect of the 
recession and financial crisis. While the analysis 
of sectoral trends provides interesting clues about 
the overall development of the variables of interest, 
a more fine-grained analysis of firm-level effects is 
required. 
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4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The research strategy of our empirical analysis 
involved two stages. Before estimating empirical 
relationships in a panel data framework, we exam-
ine the direction of causality through a standard 
Granger causality test using Vector Auto-Regres-
sion (VAR) which treats all variables symmetri-
cally without imposing any a priori assumption 
about causality. 
Earlier studies on the link between ESG and fi-
nancial performance were criticized for not paying 
sufficient attention to the problem of causality. To 
wit, companies with superior CFP may have slack 
resources to spend on ESG which may in turn en-
hance their subsequent CFP. A related argument 
is that a third factor, typically firm size, drives 
both CESGP and CFP but there is some empirical 
evidence that this may not be the case. Orlitzky’s 
(2001) meta-analysis does not confirm the rele-
vance of firm size as a confounding factor. To ad-
dress these standard criticisms emerging from the 
extant literature, we include a control for firm size 
(market capitalization) and also investigate first 
whether CESGP predicts CFP or vice-versa. The 
dependent variables tested for Granger causality 
were Tobin’s Q, total return and ESG score. In the 
panel framework, the VAR model can be specified 
as follows (see Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988):
− −
= =




it t t it t it t i it
i i
p p K X , (4)
where: pit is the performance measure for the firm 
i in year t. Kit is the ESG score for the firm i in 
year t. α0t,…, αmt, δ1t, …, δmt, τt are the coefficient 
of the linear projections of intercept, past values 
of pit, Kit and the individual effects (Xi). In this 
Granger causality test, first differences are taken 
to eliminate the individual effects and one period 
lags are included in the model. 
In the next stage of the analysis, we test the in-
fluence of ESG rating on firm value by regressing 
firm-level performance variable (Tobin’s Q or total 
return) on the contemporaneous and lagged ESG 
score (measured at t and t–1). The standard OLS 
model in a panel setting (pooled OLS) is:
=α + β + γ + + ε it it it t itp K X Z , (5)
where: Xit is the vector of firm-level financial at-
tributes (e.g. leverage, volatility, net sales and 
market cap) of firm i in year t; Zt is the industry-
level return (e.g. NAREIT index) in year t. 
In Equation 5, strict exogeneity is assumed 
between the regressors and the error term. How-
ever, more often than not, economic and financial 
relationships in aggregate and disaggregate data 
suffer from unobserved heterogeneity. This simply 
implies that the OLS assumption of orthogonality 
or exogeneity or non-correlation among dependent 
variables and the residual is not tenable. The un-
observed effects may stem from cross-sectional or 
temporal variation (or both) as follows: 
ε = δ +θ + ω it i t it , (6)
where: δi is the firm-specific effect; θt is the time 
effect; and ωit is the idiosyncratic error. As a result 
of two-way error component structure specified in 
Equation 6, the intercept in Equation 5 may vary 
across the firms or the time periods. Consequently, 
these effects may bias the estimates. The panel 
data framework applied in the next stage of the 
analysis is a more appropriate tool for isolating 
the effect of ESG performance on financial per-
formance. To this end, we employ two standard 
methods to eliminate the unobserved heterogene-
ity: first-differencing (FD) and fixed effects (FE) or 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) models 
which are similar in structure.
In a simple way, we can ‘difference out’ the 
fixed effect by subtracting (t-1) values from t as 
follows:
−− ≡ ∆ =β∆ + γ∆ + ∆ + ∆ε1( )  it it it it it t itp p p K X Z . (7)
Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is 
canceled out in Equation 7. The FD estimation in 
Equation 7 is also efficient when εit follows a ran-
dom walk. However, it is likely that the assump-
tion of no autocorrelation is violated in multiple 
panels. As a result, the standard errors will be 
biased. The GLS or Huber-White sandwich esti-
mators address this problem effectively. Hence, 
Equation 7 uses the robust standard error specifi-
cation following Arellano (1987) which is valid in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and/or serial cor-
relation, especially in a panel with a small number 
of time periods compared to the number of cross-
sections as is the case here (see Wooldridge 2002 
for a discussion). 
An alternative way of eliminating unobserved 
heterogeneity is the FE or LSDV specification 
which is equivalent to ‘de-meaning’ or ‘mean-dif-
ferencing’ the variables across cross-sections and 
time-periods respectively: 
=α + β + γ + + δ +θ + ω   it it it t i t itp K X Z , (8)
where: δi are the firm-specific dummies; θt are the 
time dummies; and ωit is the idiosyncratic error. 
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The key distinction between Equations 7 and 8 is 
how ‘within cross-section’ and ‘between cross-sec-
tion’ variations are dealt with. In multiple panels 
(T > 2), the nature of the idiosyncratic error, and 
ωit, should guide the choice between an FD and 
an FE estimator. The FE estimator is more effi-
cient when and ωit contains no serial correlation, 
which is rarely the case in economic and finan-
cial data. Conversely, the FD estimator is more 
efficient when and ωit follows a random walk (see 
Wooldridge 2002 for a discussion). To provide ro-
bust estimations, we employ both approaches in 
our analysis and compare the results.
5. FINDINGS
The first step of the analysis tests for Granger cau-
sality to rule out that ESG performance is merely 
a function of previous financial performance. Table 
4 shows the results of the empirical estimation of 
causality from both directions with total returns 
and Tobin’s Q and weighted and unweighted ESG 
scores. Overall, we do not detect Granger causality 
(indicated by insignificant p-values) neither from 
Tobin’s Q to ESG score nor from total returns to 
ESG score and hence find no empirical support for 
the hypothesis of circular causality in our data-
set. Having passed this test, we proceed on the as-
sumption that ESG scores are not or only weakly 
endogenous with returns in our dataset. However, 
additional tests will be required to rule out endo-
geneity. 
Next, we estimate the effect of ESG scores on 
the market valuation represented by the Tobin’s 
Q of a company. Table 5 presents the model esti-
mates applying a panel regression with company 
fixed effects as well as an estimation using first 
differences. The baseline model contains control 
variables for leverage, intra-year volatility, volume 
of net sales, the size effect reflected in the market 
cap as well as the NAREIT index as a proxy for 
real estate market conditions. Next, ESG scores 
are included both as contemporaneous and lagged 
predictors. The final two model variations use a 
weighted estimation using the average market 
capitalization of a company in each year. The rea-
soning behind the weighting is that larger compa-
nies should have greater influence on parameter 
estimates in line with their greater economic, so-
cial and environmental weight ‘on the ground’. 
In total, eight model variations are estimated 
for aggregate ESG indices as well as for separate 
ESG strengths and concerns. Except for Model 2, 
which is a first-differenced equation and robust-
ness check on our level specifications, all models 
include firm-level fixed effects and are estimated 
with robust standard error specification to address 
any potential heteroscedasticity problems. The 
variance inflation factors are below 2.95. Explana-
tory power, as reflected by the Adj. R2, is about 30 
percent across all models. The coefficients of the 
control variables are generally consistent across 
all eight model specifications. While leverage ex-
hibits the expected positive effect, volatility has a 
highly significant negative relationship effect on 
Tobin’s Q. All model variations show a significant 
positive impact of company size and a negative 
impact of both intra-year volatility of a company’s 
stock price and net sales. The NAREIT index is a 
significant and positive predictor of company-level 
Tobin’s Q except in the second estimation. 
Turning to the variable of interest, we find an 
overall positive impact of contemporaneous ESG 
performance on the market valuation of a company 
(Models 2 and 3). The first difference specification 
(Model 2) is broadly in line with the firm fixed ef-
fects level specification (Model 3). ESG scores for 
the previous year were not significant in explaining 
contemporaneous Tobin’s Q in Model 4. An impor-
tant consideration for time lags is the fact that the 
‘contemporaneous’ ESG is in fact lagged by at least 
several months as it refers to ESG performance 
exhibited and measured in the previous year. This 
occurs because it takes time to construct, process 
and release the ESG ratings. Hence, what we refer 
to as the ‘contemporaneous’ measure is effectively 
a partially lagging indicator of ESG performance. 
Next, we estimate the impact of ESG concerns 
and strengths separately in order to detect any dif-
ferential impact that a positive or negative rating 
may have. The results suggest that ESG perfor-
mance affects market valuation asymmetrically. 
We find that contemporaneous ESG concerns affect 
market valuation negatively. However, no signifi-
cant positive link is confirmed for ESG strengths. 
Similarly, no delayed effects are found for either 
ESG strengths or concerns. Finally, the weighted 
estimations (Models 7 and 8) do not reveal any 
marked departure from the broad results obtained 
for the unweighted models. 
Estimation results of the impact of ESG scores 
on annual total returns of a company’s shares are 
detailed in Table 6. We apply the same estima-
tion strategy as for the prediction of Tobin’s Q. 
Eight model variations are estimated including 
the baseline model, the aggregate ESG indices 
and separate ESG strengths and concerns. Except 
for Model 2 which is first-differenced, all modules 
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Table 4. Granger causality tests
DepVar: Total Returns DepVar: Total Returns
Chi-sq df p-value Chi-sq df p-value
ESG weighted 0.714 1 0.398 ESG unweighted 2.439 1 0.118
DepVar: ESG weighted DepVar: ESG unweighted
Chi-sq df p-value Chi-sq df p-value
Total Returns 0.441 1 0.507 Total Returns 2.158 1 0.142
DepVar: Log Tobin’s Q DepVar: Log Tobin’s Q
Chi-sq df p-value Chi-sq df p-value
ESG weighted 0.007 1 0.932 ESG unweighted 0.681 1 0.409
DepVar: ESG weighted DepVar: ESG unweighted
Chi-sq df p-value Chi-sq df p-value
Log Tobin’s Q 0.278 1 0.597 Log Tobin’s Q 0.093 1 0.759
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 1-period lags are included in the models.
Table 5. Panel fixed effects regression results. Dependent variable: Log Tobin’s Q



















































































































Fixed effects Firm First diff. Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Weighted by 
market cap
No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adj. R2 26.85 32.30 27.91 26.75 27.91 26.77 20.35 24.13
N 2154 1490 1831 1541 1831 1541 1490 1831
Notes: Age variable is calculated as time-variant. T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano (1987) due 
to N > T) are reported within the parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
All Variance Inflation Factors are below 2.95. Models (7) and (8) estimated with panel WLS using market capitaliza-
tion as weighting vector.
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Adj. R² 26.20 26.20 26.40 26.40 26.20 15.60 16.70 15.10
Tobin’s Q Total Return




































































Adj. R² 26.20 26.20 26.40 26.60 26.20 15.70 16.80 15.20
Notes: T-statistics with robust standard errors following Arellano (1987) due to N > T. P-values are reported within the 
brackets ( ). ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance.
Table 6. Panel fixed effects regression results. Dependent variable: Total returns

















ESG Concern (t-1) –0.504***
(–3.604)
























































































Fixed effects Firm First diff. Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Weighted by mar-
ket cap
No No No No No No Yes Yes
Adj. R2 8.90 23.46 13.59 18.15 13.59 18.35 25.25 24.11
N 2163 1495 1837 1546 1837 1546 1495 1837
Notes: Age variable is calculated as time-variant. T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano (1987) due 
to N > T) are reported within the parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
All Variance Inflation Factors are below 3.38. Models (7) and (8) estimated via panel WLS with market capitalization 
as weighting vector.
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include firm-level fixed effects. All models are es-
timated with robust standard error specification 
to address any potential heteroscedasticity prob-
lems. The variance inflation factors are below 3.38. 
The explanatory power as reflected by Adj. R2 of 
the return models is generally lower than it is for 
Tobin’s Q (in Table 5). The control variables lever-
age, price volatility, net sales, market capitaliza-
tion and NAREIT index returns all have a negative 
effect on total returns. For ESG scores, we find a 
consistent and strongly significant negative impact 
on total returns for both contemporaneous scores 
(Models 2 and 3). This finding is consistent with 
the ‘sin stock’ expectation that lower market prices 
are associated with higher returns. However, it is 
notable that when a lagged ESG score is included 
in the estimation (Model 4), the coefficient turns 
positive. It is difficult to determine whether this 
indicates a partial reversion to the mean after an 
initial drop in returns or whether it is caused by 
unobservable factors. 
To model the impact of negative and posi-
tive scores, we again include ESG strengths and 
concerns as separate variables (Models 5 and 6) 
and find that concerns exhibit a positive contem-
poraneous association with a company’s returns 
which then appears to revert, at least partially, 
in the following year. This significant relationship 
is confirmed in the weighted estimation (Model 
8). As with the Tobin’s Q estimation, no signif-
icant impact is found for ESG strengths on to-
tal returns. Overall, we find a larger number of 
concerns tend to achieve higher returns possibly 
reflecting the increased ‘sin stock’ attributes of 
these companies. 
An obvious concern in our estimation of real 
estate companies is that the industries that are 
classified as real estate-related show considerable 
variation regarding market dynamics and financial 
performance. Moreover, the summary statistics in 
Table 3 confirm that these industries also differ 
regarding their average overall ESG scores. In our 
sample of real estate companies, four sub-sectors 
are represented: Home Construction, Hotel & Oth-
ers, REITs, and Financial Services. Therefore, to 
differentiate the impact of ESG performance on 
Tobin-s Q and total returns by real estate sub-
sectors, we introduce interaction terms of ESG 
scores and sub-sector into the regression model. 
The results are reported in Table 7. Both contem-
poraneous and lagged values of overall ESG score 
and concerns and strengths are tested for each of 
the four major sub-sectors. A significant positive 
impact on market valuation (i.e. Tobin’s Q) is only 
confirmed for REITs. However, when strengths and 
concerns are examined separately, we find that it 
is ESG concerns that have the negative effect on 
market valuation of REITs. For total returns, a 
significant negative impact is confirmed for con-
temporaneous ESG score in the hotel, REIT and 
financial service industries and lagged ESG score 
for home construction. Again, we observe a pat-
tern where returns increase with concerns and the 
decrease in contemporaneous returns is partially 
offset in the following year. A separate estimation 
of the panel regressions by sub-sector presented in 
the appendix (Tables A1 and A2) largely confirms 
the results derived from the interaction term es-
timation. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has set out to investigate the link 
between social/environmental responsibility and 
financial performance for real estate companies. 
Our motivation for doing so was as follows: Indus-
tries that are heavily dependent on their market-
ing efforts and brand reputation have an innate 
incentive to care about ESG issues (which is well 
documented in the literature) but what about com-
panies that are largely hidden from the public gaze 
because consumers do not ordinarily interact with 
them and are hence not familiar with their names 
and identities? By restricting our analysis to the 
real estate sector, we were able to study the effects 
of ESG ratings on companies that depend on in-
vesting in and managing assets rather than being 
primarily driven by brand reputation and interac-
tions with consumers. 
Neither the existing empirical evidence nor the 
current conceptual frameworks provide strong a 
priori expectations for this research. Previous em-
pirical work has not produced consistent findings 
on whether companies that ‘do good’ also ‘do well’. 
In addition, there are plausible arguments to jus-
tify almost every possible empirical finding. Our 
conceptual framework proposes a link between 
ESG performance and its implications for listed 
real estate companies that is dependent upon the 
balance of costs and benefits created by the allo-
cation of resources to ESG activities. While most 
analyses have stressed the growing importance of 
trust, stakeholders and relationships to business 
performance, the opportunity cost of ESG invest-
ment also need to be acknowledged. 
The findings of the study are consistent with 
the literature in that high overall ESG ratings 
positively affect a company’s market value. When 
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distinguishing between strengths and concerns, 
we find that negative ratings (concerns) have the 
strongest effects on company value. Companies 
with a relatively high number of ESG concerns 
tend to have significantly lower market values 
while there does not appear to be a significant ef-
fect of ESG strengths. Consistent with findings on 
the performance of SRI funds, a relatively high 
overall ESG rating affects total returns negatively. 
This result is consistent across numerous model 
specifications. The level of ESG concerns has a 
significant positive effect on returns while ESG 
strengths are only weakly linked to lower returns. 
A sub-sector analysis confirms that even asset-
based sub-sectors such as REITs exhibit the same 
association of negative ESG ratings (concerns) 
with higher returns. 
It is clear that the transmission of changes in 
resources allocated to ESG issues to changes in 
share prices and corporate profitability (and vice 
versa) raises difficult timing issues with implica-
tions for further work. There are both costs and 
benefits and long and short-term effects associated 
with investment in ESG. Any ESG changes can be 
priced instantaneously in the capital markets while 
real effects on business operations are likely to be 
lagged. Further, from a real estate investment 
portfolio perspective, there is scope for further 
work on the relationship between ESG ratings and 
asset acquisition strategies. Research on whether 
real estate investment firms with high ESG rat-
ings also have distinctive asset acquisition criteria, 
for example a strong preference for eco-certified 
buildings will help to distinguish the relative con-
tributions of increased relational capital and image 
benefits compared to investment strategy.
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